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INTRODUCTION

"I'm proud to be a part of this groundbreaking decision confirming
that our nation's employment discrimination laws protect all Americans, including transgender people.

. .

. No one should be denied a

job just for being who they are."
-

Mia Macy'

Imagine waking up one day, looking in the mirror, and being unable to
identify with the person staring back at you; you do not recognize that
person, and worse, it does not feel like it is really you. Imagine that happening to you every day of your life since childhood. Worse, no one
around you knows the difficulties and challenges you are facing. Even if
they did recognize it, chances are they would neither understand nor
know how to support you. This is the nightmare many transgender or
gender nonconforming2 people deal with at some time in their lives.3
Now, picture having the courage to make your outward appearance
match your inner feelings and perception of the world-the vindication;
the empowerment. However, even with this courage you would still face
even more hardship. Transgender individuals experience discrimination
in virtually every aspect of their lives including housing, education, employment, medical care, and, in the face of this discrimination, encounter
a significant risk of being harassed, bullied, and physically assaulted.'
A recent report found sixty-three percent of transgender or gender
nonconforming survey participants have "experienced a serious act of dis1. Groundbreaking!Federal Agency Rules Transgender Employees Protected by Sex
Discrimination Law, TRANSGENDER L. CTR., http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/
archives/635 (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See Fact Sheet: Transgender & Gender Nonconforming Youth in School, SYLVIA
RIVERA LAW PROJEcT, http://www.srlp.org/resources/fact-sheet-transgender-gender-non
conforming-youth-school (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) ("'Transgender' and 'Gender nonconforming' are umbrella terms that often encompass other terms such as transsexual, cross
dresser, gender queer, femme queen, A.G., Two Spirit, and many more. It is important to
refer to people with the term they prefer."). These terms are used interchangeably
throughout this piece.
3. See generally GENNY BEEMYN & SUSAN RANKIN, THE LIvES OF TRANSGENDER
PEOPLE 39-76 (2011) (discussing the experiences of transgender survey participants).
4. See generally JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF
THlE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 1-8 (2011), available at http://
www.transequality.org/PDFs/ExecutiveSummary.pdf (outlining the discrimination, harassment, and violence faced by transgender individuals).
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crimination-events that would have a major impact on one's quality of
life and ability to emotionally or financially sustain themselves." 5 This
statistic shows the need for increased transgender rights advocacy and
protection for transgender people under the law. Furthermore, "workplace discrimination, unchecked, harms our economy both domestically
and globally." 6 Much of the discrimination felt in the transgender community manifests in employment discrimination. 7 The effects of workplace discrimination reverberate far beyond those individuals directly
discriminated against. Thus, every effort should be made to combat this
problem and this Comment takes special interest in providing protection
against transgender workplace discrimination.
This Comment provides a foundation of transgender employment discrimination law and argues transgender-based employment discrimination should be included within statutory construction of sex
discrimination under Title VII. Part II covers the history of transgender
individuals and the discrimination they endure. Part III outlines Title VII
jurisprudence as it relates to transgender employment discrimination, focusing specifically on the pre-1989 prevailing court view-developed in
the seminal cases Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins' and Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.9 -and the Federal Circuit Courts' stance, or lack
thereof, on the issue. Part IV deals with the history and impact of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on transgender
employment discrimination. Part V includes an in-depth look at the
EEOC decision in Macy v. Holder,"o focusing on the EEOC's rationale
for including transgender individuals under Title VII protections, and the
other court decisions that have relied on Macy. Finally, Part VI explores
the general implications of the EEOC's decision in Macy, any deference
its decision may receive from the Supreme Court, and its relation to the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act.

5. Id. at 7.
6. An Examination of DiscriminationAgainst Transgender Americans in the Workplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Labor, & Pensions of the H. Comm.
on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (statement of Hon. Robert E. Andrews, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Labor, & Pensions).
7. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 (providing statistics on transgender and gender identity based employment discrimination); Employment Discrimination, TRANS(last visited
GENDER L. C-R., http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/issues/employment
Nov. 9, 2013) (noting that workplace discrimination contributes to the high levels of unemployment and underemployment experienced by transgender individuals).
8. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
9. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
10. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20,
2012). This EEOC case is referenced as Macy v. Holder, as it is styled by the EEOC in its
decision.
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II. HISTORY AND DISCRIMINATION OF TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS
A.

History

The concept of changing one's gender" and sex12 burst onto the American stage in the 1950s when Christine Jorgensen became the first U.S.
citizen to publicly announce her sexual/gender identity change." Prior to
her operation, while Jorgensen served in the U.S. Army, she always felt
"she was a woman trapped inside a man's body." 4 Although her decision and subsequent procedure to change her sexual/gender identity
seemed pioneering at the time, Jorgensen's announcement did not actu-

ally reflect a new phenomenon-gender nonconformity has been acknowledged and well documented throughout human history.' 5 In fact,
in some cultures, gender nonconforming individuals were religious leaders given a special place in society.16 In other cultures, deities were
imagined as possessing ability to change their sex at will."
A 2011 study conducted by the University of California, Los Angeles
indicates there are approximately 700,000 transgender Americans, but
some authorities estimate the number to be closer to three million." The
11. Sex is defined as: "the biological and physiological characteristics that define men
and women." What Do We Mean by "Sex" and "Gender"?, WORLo HEALTI OIRG., http://
www.who.int/gender/whatisgender/en (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
12. Gender is defined as: "the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women." Id.
13. See John T. McQuiston, Christine Jorgensen,62, Is Dead; Was First to Have a Sex
Change, N.Y. TIMEs, May 4, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/04/obituaries/christinejorgensen-62-is-dead-was-first-to-have-a-sex-change.html.
"Her sexual conversion began with hormone injections in 1950, when she was [twentyfour] years old. It was completed in 1952 with surgery at the Danish State Hospital in
Copenhagen under the care of Dr. Christian Hamburger, a Danish hormone expert
whose first name she took to form her own. On her return to the United States in
1955, her transsexualism was sensationalized in the daily tabloids . . .
Id.
14. Id.
15. See DEBORAH RUDACILLE, THi
RIDDLE OF GENDER: SCIENCE, AcrivisM, AND)
TRANSGENDER RIGHTs 3 (2005) ("[F]ar from being a product of the modern world, gender

variance has been documented across cultures and in every epoch of history."); Dallas
Denny, Transgender Communities of the United States in the Late Twentieth Century, in
TRANSGENDER RiGHTs 171, 171 (Paisley Currah et al., eds., 2006) ("From prehistoric times
to the present, individuals whom today we might call transgendered and transsexual have
played a prominent role in many societies, including our own.").
16. RUDACILLE, supra note 15.

17. Id.
18. See Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Hon. Robert E. Andrews) ("[R]oughly
700,000 to 3 million transgender individuals living in America today run the risk of being
fired, demoted or not even hired because of their gender identity."); EEOC Recognizes
Transgender Discrimination,Texas Workers Rights Blog, JOIN A. WENKE (May 14, 2012),
http://www.johnwenke.com/eeoc-recognizes-transgender-discrimination-2 ("According to a

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol16/iss2/5

4

Ellis: Why the EEOC Got It Right in Macy v. Holder: The Argument for Tra

2014]

TRANSGENDER INCLUSION IN TITLE VII

379

number of individuals who undergo sex-reassignment surgery-actually
make the sex/gender transition-is much lower." Various theories attempt to explain the wide variance in estimates of the transgender population. Some posit gender identity conflicts or "disorders" go
unrecognized or misdiagnosed as other mental problems, while others
purport some transgender individuals simply never identify themselves as
such.2 0
The first organized communities in the United States for those with
nonconforming gender identities emerged in the 1950s, but they were designed exclusively for heterosexual cross-dressing men. 21 Homosexuals
and transsexuals were not welcomed until as late as the 1990s. 2 2 There
was similar exclusion of transgender and transsexual individuals within
the gay and lesbian community until the 1990s. 23 Some gay and lesbian
communities and social establishments accepted gender nonconforming
patrons and members while others did not.24 By the early 2000s, most
national gay, lesbian, and bisexual organizations had become transgender
inclusive.2 5
The medical community has also played an important role in the formation and recognition of the transgender community. From the mid1960s through the early 1990s, the medical standards imposed for transgender and transsexual individuals seeking to transition their gender were
strictly applied, with stringent guidelines on what constituted transgender

2011 UCLA study, there is an estimated 700,000 transgender people living in the United
States, and an estimated 8 million people in this country who identify themselves as gay,
lesbian or bi-sexual.").
19. See TRANSGENDER LAw & PouICY INST., TRANSGENDER ISSUis: A FACT SHEET1
(2012), available at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf ("Recent
statistics from the Netherlands indicate that about 1 in 12,000 natal males undergo sexreassignment and about 1 in 34,000 natal females.").
20. RuDACILLE, supra note 15, at 14.
21. Denny, supra note 15.

22. See id. at 172, 174 ("[T]hose who were open about their inclinations toward homosexuality or transsexualism were routinely dismissed from the cross-dressing organizations
23. Id. at 173-74.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 174; see also Issue: Transgender,HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc
.org/issues/transgender (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (advocating for transgender individuals'
equality); Transgender Issues, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://www.thetask
force.org/issues/transgender (last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (promoting transgender individuals
right's issues).
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26
characteristics.
This limited transgender
individuals from "legitimately"
identifying themselves as gender nonconforming.27
By the mid-1980s, transgender individuals began to reject the stringent
medical transgender models, and by the 1990s, most communities
adopted and accepted more flexible, expansive, and variant lifestyle
choices. 28 This brought significant pride to the transgender community
after decades of fear and shame.29

B.

Discrimination

In 2011, to create a picture of transgender discrimination in the United
States; the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and the National Center
for Transgender Equality conducted a survey of 6,450 transgender and
gender nonconforming individuals from all fifty states.3 0 The results were
heartbreaking. There were three key findings from the report." First,
while discrimination permeated participants' responses, the combination
of transgender identity and minority racial status dramatically increased
the individuals' confrontation with discrimination.
Second, poverty
among respondents was extreme, with participants being "nearly four
times more likely to have a household income of less than $10,000 per
year, compared to the general population." Finally, forty-one percent

26. See Denny, supra note 15, at 175-79 (providing an overview of the medical treatments used from the 1960s until the 1990s).
To qualify for treatment, it was important that applicants report that their gender dysphorias manifested at an early age; that they have a history of playing with dolls as a
child, if born male, or trucks and guns, if born female; that their sexual attractions
were exclusively to the same biological sex; that they have a history of failure at endeavors undertaken while in the original gender role; and that they pass or had potential to pass successfully as a member of the desired sex.
Id. at 177. Applicants would be turned away if "they were 'too successful' in their natal
gender roles[,]" were married, had read too much about transsexualism, had the "wrong"
sexual orientation, would not be considered sexually attractive in the cross-gender role, or
would not comply with the lifestyle requirements imposed by the clinics. Id.
27. See Denny, supra note 15, at 179 (claiming these models restrict gender to a binary
system that views transsexualism as merely a transitory state "to becoming a 'normal' man
or 'normal' woman").
28. Id. at 179-80.
29. See id. at 182 (stating it has become preferable for transgendered individuals to be
open about their status and that this newly found self-confidence has led to demands for
equality and justice).
30. GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 2.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.

33. Id.
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of participants reported attempting suicide, compared to less than two
percent of the general population.3 4
In the area of health care, participants reported "higher rates of HIV
infection, smoking, [and] drug and alcohol use" than those in the general
population.3 5 Approximately half of respondents said they had to educate their medical provider on transgender care, and nineteen percent
reported being refused medical care due to their transgender identity or
gender nonconforming status.
Transgender individuals experience high rates of abuse by police and
within the prison system.37 Twenty-two percent of the study's respondents who had reported interactions with police also reported harassment
by police personnel.3 ' Almost half of the participants reported apprehension in seeking assistance from the police because of their gender
identity.39
Access to housing and homelessness were also reported as problematic
among survey respondents. Nineteen percent reported housing refusal
and eleven percent reported eviction on the basis of transgender or gender nonconforming status.4 0 Nineteen percent of participants also reported experiencing homelessness at some time in their lives because of
their transgender status.41
Employment discrimination seems to be the area most extensively surveyed, and unsurprisingly, the outcome is disappointing. "Discrimination
is a major contributor to the tremendously high rates of unemployment
and underemployment faced by transgender people." 42 The unemployment rate among transgender respondents was twice that of the national
average and four times higher than minority respondents.4 3 Specifically,
the report found:
34. Id. The report notes that these suicide rates increase with loss of employment,
harassment and bullying in schools, low household income, and physical and sexual assault.
Id.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id.
37. Michelangelo Signorile, Escalating Police Violence and TransgenderPeople, Hu,FINGTON PosT (Dec. 6, 2011, 9:43 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelangelosignorile/escalating-police-violenc b 1131343.html (stating "transgender people bear the
highest proportion of violence, from bashers on the streets and from the police" and noting
the many instances of abuse in prisons); GRANT EITAL., supra note 4, at 5 (finding "[sixteen
percent] of respondents who had been to jail or prison reported being physically assaulted
and [fifteen percent] reported being sexually assaulted").
38. GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id.
42. TRANSGENDER L. CTR., supra note 7.
43. GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
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Widespread mistreatment at work:
Ninety percent .

.

. of those surveyed reported experiencing harass-

ment, mistreatment or discrimination on the job or took actions like
hiding who they are to avoid it.
Forty-seven percent . . . said they had experienced an adverse job

outcome, such as being fired, not hired or denied a promotion because of being transgender or gender non-conforming.
Over one-quarter ([twenty-six percent]) reported that they had lost a
job due to being transgender or gender non-conforming and [fifty
percent] were harassed.
Large majorities attempted to avoid discrimination by hiding their
gender or gender transition [seventy-one percent] or delaying their
gender transition [fifty-seven percent].
The vast majority [seventy-eight percent] of those who transitioned
from one gender to the other reported that they felt more comfortable at work and their job performance improved, despite high levels
of mistreatment.4 4
Additionally, respondents who were unemployed or lost employment
due to their gender identity indicated increased issues with health, homelessness, drug and alcohol use, incarceration, and working in the underground economy.45
Violence against transgender individuals should not be overlooked. "A
nationwide survey*of bias-motivated violence against [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender (LGBT)] people from 1985 to 1998 found that incidents targeting transgender people accounted for [twenty percent] of all
murders and about [forty percent] of all police-initiated violence." 4 6 A
2011 report showed an increase in overall violence against the LGBT
community, with a disproportionate impact on "transgender communities, [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and HIV-affected
Communities (LGBTQH)] people of color communities, as well as ...
LGBTQH youth and young adults." 47 Documented violence against
transgender people demonstrates that it is inflicted by both strangers and
individuals they know, occurs within the home and in public, and includes

44. Id.
45. Id.
46.
47.

TRANSGENDER

LAW AND POLICY INs-rTTUE,

NAT'L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE

supra note 19.

PROGRAMs, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST

LES-

BIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL , TRANSGENDER, QUEER AND HIV-AlFECFED COMMUNITIES IN THE

U.S. IN 2011, at 7 (2012), available at http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/Reports/2012
NCAVP_2011_HV_Report.pdf.
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physical and sexual assault and harassment. 4 8 Unfortunately, the accounts of violence highlight "that the majority of transgender people will
experience violence in their lifetimes, and that risk for violence starts at
an early age." 4 9
While unnerving to some, these statistics and anecdotes concern real,
human lives and must not be ignored. In particular, employment discrimination data illustrates the need for concrete legal protection of transgender employees: the very protection advocated by the EEOC in its
Macy v. Holder decision.
III.

A.

TITLE VII AND TRANSGENDER EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Title VII History
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19640 states "it shall be an unlawful

employment practice .

.

. to discriminate against any individual .

.

. be-

cause of such individual's . . . sex.""' The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains many titles concerning discrimination of one type or another. 52
Some of the other titles deal with "enforcement of federal voting rights,
48. Rebecca L. Stotzer, Violence Against Transgender People: A Review of United
States Data, 14 AGGRESSION & VIouWr BEiHAV. 170, 177 (2009).
49. Id. at 178.
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (2006).
51. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). This provision of the statute specifically applies to private employers who regularly employ fifteen or more employees. Id. § 2000e(b) (2006).
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person,
but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by
the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of
the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as
defined in section 2102 of Title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other
than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title
26 ....

Id. § 2000e(b) (2006). As the statute indicates, the law did not originally apply to federal
employers. Id. § 2000e(b) (2006). However, in 1972, a federal law was enacted to expand
the requirements of Title VII to federal employers. Id. § 2000e-16 (2006); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 103, 111 (1972), available
at http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/1972/1972-092-0261.pdf. This is the provision relied on
by the EEOC in the Macy v. Holder decision. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821,
2012 WL 1435995, at *5 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012). Since there is no substantive difference
between the two provisions on what type of discrimination is prohibited-discrimination
based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"-the EEOC's evaluation should
apply equally to private employer discrimination. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2006)
(applying to government employees and employers), with, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(d)
(2006) (applying to qualifying public sector employees and employers).
52. 21 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 4 (1974) ("Title VII is one of several major titles of the
omnibus legislation known as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
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elimination of discrimination in public accommodations and in facilities
owned or managed by a state or by one of its subdivisions, or in programs
receiving federal financial assistance, and assistance in the desegregation
of public schools." 5 1
Reducing racial discrimination in the workplace is the generally accepted main purpose of Title VII of the Act.54 "Sex," an amendment
proposed by Representative Howard Smith, was included in the statute
just before the House of Representatives voted on the bill." Because
"sex" was included late in the process, there is little legislative history on
the meaning and scope of "sex," as envisioned by the enacting Congress. 5 6 As a result, most courts have interpreted "sex" narrowly and
have stuck to its traditional meaning.57
53. Id. § 4 (footnotes omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (2006) (voting rights); 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006) (public accommodation discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(d)
(2006) (public accommodations in, owned, or managed by a state or a subdivision of the
state); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (discrimination in federal financial assistance programs);
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2 (2006) (public school desegregation).
54. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) ("When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 it was primarily concerned with race discrimination."); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355-2519) ("The major concern of Congress at the time the Act was
promulgated was race discrimination."). At that time, even the EEOC believed its main
concern was to address racial discrimination. See also Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARv. L. Riv. 1307, 1333 (2012) ("Indeed,
EEOC commissioners routinely expressed concern in this period that the law's prohibition
of sex discrimination would 'interfere with its main concern, racial discrimination."').
55. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 ("Sex as a basis of discrimination was added as a floor
amendment on day before the House approved Title VII, without prior hearing or debate."). Some say this was in an effort to stall or stop passage of the Act altogether. Jason
Lee, Symposium, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDERi 423, 429-30 (2012).
The day before the House of Representatives was due to vote on the Act, Representative Howard Smith, a staunch opponent of the bill, introduced a floor amendment
adding "sex" to the list of impermissible bases for employment discrimination as a
last-ditch effort to blunt legislative support and prevent the bill's passage. Representative Smith's gamble failed and Title VII was enacted with the sex provision intact.
Id.
56. See e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (noting the "total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment"); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982) (pointing out that the "sex" amendment was passed "without prior legislative hearings and little debate"); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 ("There is a dearth of legislative history
on Section 2000e-2(a)(1) . . . .").
57. See e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 ("Congress never considered nor intended that
this 1964 legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex."); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 (adhering to the idea that Congressional failure to expand Title VII
coverage to "sexual preference" "indicates that the word 'sex' in Title VII is to be given its
traditional definition, rather than an expansive interpretation."); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662
(9th Cir. 1977) ("Giving the statute its plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress
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Notably, in the 1976 case General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the U.S.
Supreme Court held "sex" under Title VII could not encompass discrimination based on pregnancy.5 9 However, Congress overturned this decision by subsequently passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
which amended Title VII's definition of sex discrimination to include
pregnancy discrimination.60 Does this action suggest Congress intends
narrow judicial construction of "sex," with exception for pregnancy accommodation discrimination? Rather, does it suggest Congress sought
remediation of narrow court interpretation of "sex?" Since 1978, Congress has neither expanded nor elaborated on the meaning of "sex" pursuant to Title VII. However, since rendering its decision in General
Electric, the Supreme Court has addressed many issues related to sex
discrimination. 6 1
B.

Pre-Price Waterhouse Cases

Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins in 1989, transgender individuals were categorically afforded no
protection under Title VII. According to influential cases on the topic,
transgender persons have not been a class of persons covered by Title
VII. 62 This remains true in many cases. 63
had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind."). But see Franklin, supra note 54, at 1320
(proposing that there was significant debate at the time as to what "sex" meant, therefore
negating strict fidelity to any "traditional concept" of sex).
58. Gen. Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
59. Id. at 125, 145-46.
60. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
61. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (asserting
same-sex sexual harassment is covered under Title VII as sex discrimination); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (holding discrimination based on "sex
stereotyping" is a viable claim under Title VII); Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (finding "a claim of 'hostile environment' sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII").
62. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984) ("In our view, to
include transsexuals within the reach of Title VII far exceeds mere statutory interpretation.
Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act, and it has
rejected subsequent attempts to broaden the scope of its original interpretation. For us to
now hold that Title VII protects transsexuals would take us out of the realm of interpreting
and reviewing and into the realm of legislating."); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d
748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Because Congress has not shown an intention to protect
transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based on one's transsexualism does not fall within
the protective purview of [Title VII]."); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
664 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A transsexual individual's decision to undergo sex change surgery
does not bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within the scope of Title VII.
This court refuses to extend the coverage of Title VII to situations that Congress clearly
did not contemplate.").
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Furthermore, these cases demurred "sex" does not include gender
identity because Congress did not intend such when it enacted the Civil
Rights Act, and did it include gender identity within its amendment
prohibiting sex discrimination.64 This assumption was largely based on
absence of congressional legislative history defining "sex" or describing
what it should entail. 65 Courts concluded the limited evidence on the definition of "sex" meant it could only encompass the "traditional" idea of
sex, a binary of male or female based on sexual anatomy. 6 6 Some also
relied on the idea that "sex" was included in order to afford women

63. Transgender identity as a class or sub-set of sex is not a protect category of people,
like race, religion or national origin, the argument being made by Macy v. Holder, and in
this paper, is that transgender identity is already part of the definition and understanding
of "sex." See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) ("[W]hen the
plaintiff is transsexual, direct evidence of discrimination based on sex stereotypes may look
a great deal like discrimination based on transsexuality itself, a characteristic that, in and of
itself, nearly all federal courts have said is unprotected by Title VII."); Etsitty v. Utah
Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e conclude discrimination against
a transsexual because she is a transsexual is not 'discrimination because of sex.' Therefore,
transsexuals are not a protected class under Title VII . . . ."); see also Edward J. Reeves &
Lainie D. Decker, Before ENDA: Sexual Orientationand Gender Identity Protections in the
Workplace Under Federal Law, 20 L. & SEXUALrry 61, 75 (2011) ("Federal courts have
conclusively held that transgender individuals are not afforded protection under Title VII
when the discrimination is based on transsexuality itself."); William C. Sung, Note, Taking
the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining "Because of Sex" to Include Gender
Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation,and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. Rrv. 487, 515-17 (2011)
(stating that "gender identity is not 'sex'" by explaining the legal landscape of Title VII sex
discrimination jurisprudence).
64. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 ("The phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination
based on sex, in its plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women
because they are women and against men because they are men. The words of Title VII do
not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual identity disorder . . . "); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 ("[F]or the purposes of Title VII the plain meaning must be ascribed
to the term 'sex' in absence of clear congressional intent to do otherwise. Furthermore, the
legislative history does not show any intention to include transsexualism in Title VII.");
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663 ("Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the
term 'sex' to its traditional meaning.").
65. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (noting the "total lack of legislative history supporting
the sex amendment...."); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 (pointing out that the sex amendment
was passed "without prior legislative hearings and little debate"); Holloway, 566 F.2d at
662 ("There is a dearth of legislative history on Section 2000e-2(a)(1) . . . ."). But see
Franklin, supra note 54, at 1320 (asserting there was significant debate at the time as to
what "sex" meant and encompassed).
66. See e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 ("[W]e decline in behalf of the Congress to judicially expand the definition of 'sex' as used in Title VII beyond its common and traditional
interpretation."); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 ("[Tlhe word 'sex' in Title VII is to be given its
traditional definition . . . ."); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 ("Giving the statute its plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind.").
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equality and protection from discrimination in the workplace. 6 7 Ultimately, courts found Congress' failure to expand the definition of sex was
the best evidence against courts taking steps to expand the definition
themselves.
C.

Oncale and Same-Sex Harassment

In 1988, the Supreme Court held in Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, Inc. that same-sex sexual harassment is a cognizable claim under
Title VII. 69 The significant analysis of the Supreme Court illustrates
same-sex sexual harassment may not have been within the original scope
of Congress when it enacted Title VII, but "statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils."o
Oncale is important for transgender sex discrimination claims because
the Supreme Court established Title VII as an evolving statute, capable
67. See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) ("It is, however, generally recognized that the major thrust of the 'sex' amendment was towards providing equal opportunities for women."); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663 ("The manifest
purpose of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in employment is to ensure
that men and women are treated equally, absent a bona fide relationship between the
qualifications for the job and the person's sex.").
68. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (surmising
that the failure of Congress to pass Title VII amendment proposals to cover sexual orientation "strongly indicates that the phrase in the Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex should be given a narrow, traditional interpretation, which would also
exclude transsexuals"); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 (citing that, collectively, ten bills were
introduced to the 94th and 95th Congresses which would have prohibited discrimination
based on "'sexual preference"' were defeated "indicat[ing] that the word 'sex' in Title VII
is to be given its traditional definition"); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d
659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Several bills have been introduced to amend the Civil Rights
Act to prohibit discrimination against 'sexual preference.' None have been enacted into
law. Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term 'sex' to its traditional meaning.").
69. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
70. Id. at 79; see Sung, supra note 63, at 522-23 (summarizing Oncale). One author
notes:
In addition to recognizing that the statutory language of Title VII is sufficiently broad
to be read as covering same-sex harassment, the Court observed that the harassing
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire in order to give rise to an inference of
sex discrimination. Thus, while Oncale did not specifically rule on the issue of whether
same-sex harassment motivated by gender stereotypes is actionable, the Court laid
down the doctrinal foundation for later courts to extend the sex-stereotyping doctrine
to sexual harassment claims. These courts' reasoning is clear: if discrimination on the
basis of gender nonconformity is discrimination because of sex, and same-sex harassment not motivated by sexual desire is actionable, then it must follow that same-sex
harassment motivated by the harassee's nonconforming gender traits is also actionable
under Title VII.
Sung, supra note 63, at 522-23.
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of expansion in covering similar problems not originally envisioned by
Congress. This decision implies that, in the area of employment discrimination, the Supreme Court may likely extend definitions incorporating
discrimination not originally envisioned by the men and women who created Title VII.
D.

Price Waterhouse and Sex Stereotyping

In 1989, the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
provided an evaluative framework for determining sex and gender discrimination under Title VII. The case involved a woman who was denied
a promotion by her employer because of "sex stereotyping."' Hopkins
was described by her fellow employees as "macho" and "masculine," and
also "overcompensat[ed] for being a woman."7 2 She was criticized for
using profanity, which one partner found particularly offensive because it
came from a woman, and she was indirectly advised to go to charm school
and walk, talk, and dress more femininely, wear makeup, style her hair,
and wear jewelry. 3
The first major Supreme Court decision was interpreting the meaning
of "sex" to include gender.74 This decision considered the varying sexual
definitions and understandings, contemplating sex as encompassing not
only anatomical representation, but also including the sociological meaning of sex." The Supreme Court ultimately held discrimination on the
basis of gender includes discrimination based upon sex stereotyping.7 6
The Court stated the following concerning the legal validity of sex
stereotyping:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees
by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group, for "[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire

71. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36, 250 (1989).
72. Id. at 235 (quoting the record).
73. Id. (quoting the record).
74. Id. at 239-40 ("Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account
in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute. . . . We take these
words [Title VII statutory language regarding sex discrimination] to mean that gender must
be irrelevant to employment decisions.").
75. Id. at 250-52 (discussing the role of sex stereotyping in the case).
76. Id. at 250 ("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted
on the basis of gender.")
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spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.""
Finally, the Court noted its decision in no way limited "the possible
ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision."" Today, Price Waterhouse is the principal case to which
courts look for guidance in evaluating Title VII employment discrimination claims brought by transgender plaintiffs."
E. Protections Provided by Federal Circuit Courts and States
Unlike the Supreme Court, Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal do not
categorically extend sex stereotyping to include gender nonconformity.
Few Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have addressed the issue of transgender protection under Title VII. Thus far, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
are the only circuits to address a Title VII claim brought by a transgender
plaintiff.so The First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have addressed claims
based on other laws brought by transgender plaintiffs. In these cases, the
courts either analogized them to Title VII claims or applied the Price
Waterhouse sex stereotyping framework. 8 ' The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have extended the sex stereotyping framework to discrimination based on sexual orientation. 8 2 Presumably, these courts would
77. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting L.A. Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart,435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 251-52. This is largely due to the Court's focus on the burden of proof in
proving sex stereotyping allegations and rebuttals to that evidence. See id. at 258. ("We
hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating
part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not taken the plaintiffs gender into account.").
79. See Lee, supra note 55, at 436-37 ("[T]he Gender Nonconformity Approach has
been the dominant way in which transgender plaintiffs have contested employment discrimination under Title VII. The approach focuses exclusively on the gender nonconformity of the plaintiff, and thus relies heavily on the rationale underlying the Price Waterhouse
decision.").
80. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (suing under
Title VII); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2004) ("assert[ing] Title VII
claims of sex discrimination and retaliation").
81. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1313, 1316-20 (11th Cir. 2011) (suing under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the court employing the sex stereotyping evaluation); Rosa v. Park
W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 213-15 (1st Cir. 2000) (suing under the Equal Credit
Opportunities Act while the court interpreted the claim under Title VII case law);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000) (pursuing a Eighth
Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Gender Motivated Violence Act, with
the court analogizing the GMVA to Title VII).
82. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002) (recognizing that the gender stereotyping claims should be
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extend the sex stereotyping framework to gender identity claims or transgender claims.83
The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits remain
completely silent on the issue, signaling transgender Americans living
within these circuits' jurisdiction will continue to receive no solid legal
protection from workplace discrimination under Title VII. Implicated
states include Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia.8 4
Overall, sixteen states-California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington-and the District of Columbia have enacted their own transgender-inclusive discrimination laws." Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota all have state legislation
affording workplace discrimination protection for gender identity, 6 but a
transgender employee would still not have a viable federal claim. There
are also scattered counties, cities, and townships that have enacted gender identity protection despite the fact that their states have no trans-

available to those alleging same-sex sexual harassment, but concluding that the homosexual plaintiff did not allege the appropriate evidence of sex stereotyping to sustain his
claim); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the possible
application of the sex stereotyping framework to homosexual plaintiffs, but holding that
the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege facts for the court to evaluate such a claim); Doe v.
City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (approving Title VII sex stereotyping claims for two perceived homosexual males when the harassment came in the form of gender norming and
sexual harassment). The Simonton court also points out that applying sex stereotyping to
homosexuals claiming such discrimination "would not bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and
not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine. But, under this theory, relief would
be available for discrimination based upon sexual stereotypes." Simonton v. Runyon, 232
F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
83. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 592 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing its circuit decision in Ulane
and seeming to purport the court would have allowed a sex stereotyping claim for plaintiff
Ulane had she made that argument instead of focusing on her transgender status).
84. See Court Locator, U.S. COURrs, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtjlocator.aspx (last
visited Nov. 10, 2013).
85. Non-Discrimination Laws that Include Gender Identity and Expression, TRANSGENDER LAW & PoucY INsT., http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm (last edited Feb. 1, 2012).
86. 775 Iu. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A), 5/1-103(0-1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp.
2012); IoWA CODE §§ 216.2(10), 216.6(1)(a)-(c) (2013); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 363A.02.01(a)(1), 363A.03.44, 363A.08 (West 2012).
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gender discrimination laws, but these practices are far from being
consistent or widespread.
It may be assumed that all of these jurisdictions would apply the Price
Waterhouse sex stereotyping framework to a transgender claim if it meets
the necessary requirements, but that does not mean these jurisdictions
would be sympathetic to including transgender people under sex discrimination categorically. Analysis of the cases in which courts have afforded
transgender plaintiffs coverage under Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition illustrates the importance of extending Title VII coverage for
transgender people beyond merely sex stereotyping.
IV.
A.

EEOC

BACKGROUND AND IMPACT

EEOC Creation, Purpose, and History

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was established in 1964 under Title VII, and is entrusted with enforcing the provisions of Title VII." In addition to enforcing Title VII and its
amendments-including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act-the EEOC
has authority to enforce the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Sections 102 and 103 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA).
At its inception the EEOC had limited methods with which it could
enforce Title VII laws. Originally, the methods primarily utilized were
"conciliation, education, outreach[,] and technical assistance," 90 which
were fairly limited in effect. In 1972, Congress gave the EEOC litigation
enforcement authority9 1 which has since become its primary focus for en87. See TRANSGENDER LAw & PoIcY INSTITUTE, supra note 85 (enumerating jurisdictions that currently have gender identity and sexual orientation anti-discrimination
laws). According to the Transgender Law and Policy Institute, since 1975, one-hundred
and sixty jurisdictions have enacted some form of law that affords protection based on
gender identity or gender expression. Id.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006) (creating the EEOC).
89. Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL Emu'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www

.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
90. 35 Years of Ensuring the Promise of Opportunity, U.S. EQUAL Emp'T OProRTu(last visited
NITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/history/index.html
Nov. 10, 2013).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(b) (2006) (giving the EEOC authority to issue a charge on
its own authority following an investigation); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 1-3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972); see also id. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (2006) ("The
Commission shall have power . . . to intervene in a civil action brought under section
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forcement and an increasingly effective tool for resolving disputes.
Consequently, the influence of the EEOC has expanded.
As a requirement of all laws enforced by the EEOC, except for the
EPA, an individual must file a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC
before he or she files a discrimination lawsuit in either federal or state
court; this applies to both private and federal sector employees and job
applicants.93 In this process, the claimant completes a standard form,
usually with EEOC assistance, but without an attorney's assistance. 94
The Charge of Discrimination affects any subsequent litigation; litigants
may not proceed with a lawsuit until they file a Charge of Discrimination
and proceed with the required administrative process.95
Also noteworthy to the history and direction of the EEOC are the
roles of commissioners themselves. Each commissioner has their own
goals and ideas for where the EEOC should expend its resources and

2000e-5 of this title by an aggrieved party against a respondent other than a government,
governmental agency or political subdivision.").
92. U.S. EOUAL Emr"T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 90.
93. Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMr'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,

http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Filinga
Charge]; Overview of Federal Sector EEO Complaint Process, U.S. EQUAL Empr'T OPPOR-

COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed-employees/complaint_overview.cfm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Overview]. The federal employee or job applicant
process is considerably more complicated than the private sector process, and has a much
shorter statute of limitations (forty-five days). Id. But again, this process must be completed before filing a suit in federal court. Id. An individual may have another individual,
agency, or organization file the necessary charge on his or her behalf in order to protect his
or her identity as well. Filing a Charge, supra.
'UNITY

94. How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OrPORCOMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/howtofile.cfm (last visited Nov. 24,

[UNITY

2013).
95. Filing a Charge, supra note 93; see also Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC:
Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 Oiiio STr. L.J. 1,
6-7 (1996) (indicating the original charge document has generated "a substantial amount
of litigation over [its] relevance and proper interpretation"). However, the EEOC addressed this issue in its decision in Macy v. Holder making it less likely to become a problem for a transgender complainant. See Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL
1435995, at *5 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012) (noting the Agency's mistake in separating Macy's
claims into two different procedures based on the language she used in her complaint and
stating that all of her claims were stating sex discrimination).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2006).
There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which shall be composed of five members, not more than three of
whom shall be members of the same political party. Members of the Commission
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
for a term of five years.
Id.
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time.97 However, the overall mission of the EEOC may be simply defined as "the elimination of illegal discrimination from the workplace.""
Given its mission and the mandates discussed, it is no surprise the EEOC
has been involved in the overwhelming majority of employment discrimination claims.9 9
B.

Impact of the EEOC in the Judiciary

In the area of transgender employment discrimination, the EEOC has
significant impact on the process by which a transgender individual seeks
redress for employment-related discrimination. All victims of transgender discrimination must go through the EEOC before filing their case
in a state or federal court.1" This is due to the decision in Macy v.
Holder, which states, "[All EEOC offices will now be required to accept
and investigate gender identity and transgender discrimination claims." 0 1
This requirement will certainly aid in validating and standardizing the
way these claims are addressed and handled by the EEOC. Additionally,
recognition of transgender claims at the process's outset will help legitimize such claims in federal and state courts as well, depending on the
level of deference given to the EEOC's decision in Macy.
Beyond the manner in which Title VII claims are processed, evaluating
impact of the EEOC requires examining the level of deference the Supreme Court, and therefore lower courts, have historically afforded the
EEOC. Generally, there are two kinds of deference provided to EEOC
decisions-Chevron deference and Skidmore deference.1 02 However, in
evaluating the actions of the EEOC, the Supreme Court does not always
apply these deference frameworks. 0 3

97. U.S. EoUM.

EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 90.

98. Id.
99. Selmi, supra note 95, at 1 (recognizing the EEOC's long involvement in employment discrimination law and that "the vast majority of employment discrimination claims
have been initially processed by that agency"). This author acknowledges this while advocating that the EEOC should either be eliminated or overhauled to focus on less lucrative
cases-those less likely to be pursued by a private attorney. Id. at 4.
100. See Filing a Charge, supra note 93 (providing that a complaint for a discrimination lawsuit can be initiated by filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC); see also
Overview, supra note 93 (explaining the process for filing a complaint).
101. WENKE, supra note 18.

102. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. Riev. 1937, 1939-41 (2006) (discussing the two deference tests applied by the Supreme Court to federal agency action).
103. See Hart, supra note 102, at 1937 ("In the area of federal antidiscrimination law,
the U.S. Supreme Court often prefers to 'chart its own course' rather than to defer to
[EEOC] .

.

. regulations and guidance interpreting these laws.").

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

19

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 2, Art. 5

394

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 16:375

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,'0 4 the
Supreme Court established a two-part test for deciding the deference that
should be given by the Supreme Court to an executive agency.' 0 5 Initially, a court must determine whether Congress has spoken directly to
the issue and if their intent was clear.106 If so, both the agency and the
Supreme Court must follow Congress' meaning and intent 07 If not, a
court must determine whether the agency's interpretation is a permissible
construction of the statute.' 0 8 The agency's construction must not be "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."' 09 Deference
will only be given when it is fairly clear that Congress intended to delegate legislative interpretation to the agency; this can be done explicitly or
implicitly." 0 Regarding congressional delegation, the Supreme Court
stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency. 1 '
Delegation of legislative interpretation simply requires that the agency
interpretation of the statute be reasonable. The Supreme Court concluded that it has "long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme
it is entrusted to administer . . . .""' This is exactly what Congress has
entrusted the EEOC to do-administer and enforce Title VII.1' 3
"The majority of cases in which the Supreme Court has applied [the]
Chevron [deference test] have involved notice-and-comment rulemaking

104. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
105. Id. at 842.
106. Id. at 842-43.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 843.
109. Id. at 844.
110. Id. at 843-44.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 844.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2006) ("The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as
set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title.").
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or formal adjudication." 14 The EEOC's decision in Macy v. Holder
came from a formal adjudication,"'s and as such should be afforded Chevron deference. However, even if the Supreme Court will not apply Chevron deference there is another deference test that may be used-the
Skidmore deference test.1 16
In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 117 the Supreme Court delineated a test for
deciding where deference should be given to an agency's statutory interpretation where there is not express or implied congressional delegation.'
The Supreme Court stated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of [an
agency], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control."

Thus, whenever agency interpretation lacks congressional delegation, the
court should look to many factors in determining if the agency's construction should be considered legitimate or not. This is not a straightforward
reasonableness standard like the Chevron test and allows the court to
look at more surrounding evidence in determining the appropriateness of
agency interpretation.
"The Court applies this Skidmore standard in reviewing a wide variety
of agency interpretations, ranging from opinion letters addressed to specific disputes to more generally applicable policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines." 2 0 Because these types of agency
actions tend to be more common than notice-and-comment rulemaking
and formal adjudication, this is the level of deference most often employed by courts.121

114. Hart, supra note 102, at 1940.
115. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Apr.
20, 2012).
116. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (enunciating a
test for agency action deference to be followed by courts).
117. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 134.
118. Hart, supra note 102 (explaining the Skidmore test is a less deferential standard
that the Chevron test).
119. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
120. Hart, supra note 102, at 1941.
121. Id.
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However, as noted above, "[m]uch of the time, whether it agrees with
the agency or not, the Court has simply declined to decide what standard
of deference it should apply to an EEOC interpretation, even when the
interpretation at issue is made pursuant to the agency's explicitly delegated authority."1 22 "[I]n the specific context of federal antidiscrimination law, the Court tends either to avoid the question of what deference is
due, or to refuse deference to the EEOC under any standard." 1 2 3 This
peculiarity will require examining the Supreme Court's application of
both tests to glean an impression of its possible evaluation of the Macy v.
Holder decision.
V.

MACY v. HOLDER: THE

EEOC's

DECISION

"With so many barriers to gainful employment in our society, we
can't let discrimination be one of them. The EEOC's decision ensures that every transgender person in the United States will have
legal recourse when faced with employment discrimination. Having
the protection of federal sex-discrimination law is especially critical
for transgender people who live in the [thirty-four] states that lack
transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination laws. This is a game
changer for transgender America."
24
- Masen DaviS1
A.

Macy v. Holder Facts

Mia Macy was a police detective in Phoenix, Arizona who decided to
move to San Francisco, California for family reasons.12 5 Her supervisor
in Phoenix told her about an opening with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) at a crime laboratory for which

Macy was qualified.12 6

From late 2010 to early 2011, Macy spoke with the lab director regarding the position and claims she was offered the job if her background
check revealed no issues.127 The hiring process began in January 2011
when the contractor responsible for filling the position contacted Macy;
she was asked to complete the required paperwork and an investigator
was assigned to perform her required background check. 128
122. Id. at 1942.
123. Hart, supra note 102, at 1939.
124. TRANSGENDER L. CTR., supra note 1.
125. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821,2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Apr.
20, 2012) ("[Macy] was still known as a male at that time ....
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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On March 29, 2011, Macy informed the contractor she was in the process of transitioning from male to female and asked that this information
be given to the director of the lab as well. 12 9 Five days after the contractor informed the ATF of Macy's name and gender changes, Macy was
told the position was no longer available due to federal budget cuts.'
Distressed over the rapid change in events, Macy contacted a counselor
with the EEOC to discuss her concerns. 13 ' The counselor informed her
the position was not, in fact, cut due to budget concerns, but that another
applicant was hired because that person was further along in the background investigation.1 3 2 Macy took the differing stories of why she was
denied the position as evidence that the ATF did not want to hire her
because she was a transgender individual.133
Macy filed her formal EEOC complaint with the ATF on June 13, 2011,
alleging discrimination based on sex, gender identity, and sex stereotyping.134 On October 26, 2011, the ATF accepted and referred her claims
for investigation, but stated only her sex discrimination claim could be
taken up through the EEOC process, and that her "gender identity stereotyping" claims would have to be processed according to the applicable
Department of Justice (DOJ) policy.' 5 Macy and her attorney disagreed
with this finding and, after withdrawing the part of her complaint previ-

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *2.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Department of Justice has one system for processing sex discrimination
complaints and another process for processing sexual orientation and gender identity complaints. Id. Claims based on "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability
(physical or mental), genetic information, and reprisal" will be adjudicated according to
EEOC regulations. Equal Employment Opportunity Program, 1200.1, Ch. 4-1, § B.7.a
(Dep't of Justice Sept. 12, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/hr/hrorder/chpt4-1
.htm. Those based on "gender identity, sexual orientation or status as a parent" will be
adjudicated as outlined in Section B.7.j, which states:
Complaints of discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation, gender identity, or
status as a parent will be processed by utilizing the informal EEO counseling process
and, as necessary, the EEO Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Program. If the
dispute is not resolved, the complainant is entitled to an investigation and a final Department decision. Back pay and non-monetary remedies are available when there is
a finding of discrimination on either basis. Individual entitlement in this regard is derived from Department of Justice policy and practice and not from EEOC regulations
which govern other types of discrimination complaints in the Federal Sector. Although complaints based on sexual orientation and parental status are processed
under the same administrative time frames, they cannot be the subject of a hearing
before an EEOC administrative judge or an appeal to the EEOC.
Id.
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ously accepted by the DOJ, requesting an appeal from the EEOC on the
remainder of her claim.13 6
This procedural jockeying was important to the EEOC because it ultimately decided all of Macy's claims were "different ways of stating the
same claim of discrimination 'based on . . . sex."'"3 7 Therefore, the
EEOC saw no distinction between claims based on "sex," "transgender
status," "gender identity" or a change in sex or gender; they were all valid
under Title VII.'3 8
B.

Macy v. Holder Analysis

The Macy decision began by pointing out under Title VII, the term
"sex" includes both gender and the biological distinctions that distinguish
men from women. 1 3 9 This language was borrowed from the Supreme
Court's decision in Price Waterhouse, which emphasized sex discrimination could also include discrimination based on gender roles and
norms.14 0 Therefore, the terms sex and gender are often used interchangeably when discussing Title VII discrimination prohibitions.141
While the terms do not share the exact same meaning, for the purposes of
Title VII, "sex" incorporates both elements of sex and gender to the point
where the statute may as well include the term gender in its language.
The EEOC found the inclusion of gender discrimination in Title VII
important to the transgender discrimination issue "because the term 'gender' encompasses not only a person's biological sex, but also the cultural
and social aspects associated with masculinity and femininity. "142 Ac136. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *3-4.
137. Id. at *5.
138. Id. at *4-5.
139. Id. at *5.
140. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989). "Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions appears on the
face of the statute." Id. at 229 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d
1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Title VII bar[s] not just discrimination because of biological
sex, but also gender stereotyping-failing to act and appear according to expectations defined by gender."); Smith v. City of Salem 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The Supreme
Court made clear that in the context of Title VII, discrimination because of 'sex' includes
gender discrimination . . . ."); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[U]nder Price Waterhouse, 'sex' under Title VII encompasses both sex-that is, the biological differences between men and women-and gender.").
141. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *5.
142. Id. at *6. Compare Gender-Dictionary, MERRIAM-WEBST11R,

http://www.mer-

riam-webster.com/dictionary/gender (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (defining "gender" as "the
behavioral, cultural, or psychological traits typically associated with one sex"), with
BLACK'S LAw DIclONARY 1498 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "sex" as "[t]he sum of the pecu-

liarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female organism;
gender.").
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cording to the EEOC, if this were not the case, the only basis for sex
discrimination would be if "an employer preferred a man over a woman,
or vice versa."1 4 3 If this limited scope applied, many instances of sexbased discrimination would go unaddressed.
For the EEOC, gender discrimination, and therefore sex discrimination, "occurs any time an employer treats an employee differently for failing to conform to any gender based expectations or norms." 4 4 The
linchpin to sex discrimination is whether the discrimination was "related
to the sex of the victim.,"145 This finding was based on the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Price Waterhouse that gender should not be "a motivating part in an employment decision ... ."146

However, both the Supreme Court and the EEOC recognized and discussed the one statutory exception sex discrimination prohibition' -the
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).148 Generally, an employer
may consider sex where it "is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise .

. . ."149

Where a sex-based trait is reasonably necessary to

perform the position's duties, sex may be considered in hiring or firing an
employee. But, the Supreme Court concluded, and the EEOC agreed,
that "[t]he only plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in
all other circumstances, a person's gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her." 50
The EEOC held discriminating against someone because that person is
transgender is discrimination related to the sex of the victim. 51 The
EEOC went on to say:
This is true regardless of whether an employer discriminates against
an employee because the individual has expressed his or her gender
in a non-stereotypical fashion, because the employer is uncomfortable with the fact that the person has transitioned or is in the process
of transitioning from one gender to another, or because the employer simply does not like that the person is identifying as a trans-

143. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *6 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Schwenk v. Hartford,204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir.
2000)).
146. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (emphasis added).
147. See id. at 242 (discussing the BFOQ exception); Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *6
(noting the BFOQ exception).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
149. Id.
150. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242; Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *6 (quoting Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989)).
151. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7.
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gender person. In each of these circumstances, the employer is
making a gender-based evaluation, thus violating the Supreme
Court's admonition that "an employer may not take gender into account in making an employment decision." 1 5 2
Therefore, the EEOC affords Title VII coverage to transgender individuals when they are discriminated against because they are gender noncoriforming and simply because they are transgender-a trait/status and
identity which encompasses aspects of sex and gender." 3 This is critical
because sex stereotyping claims should presumably be available to anyone, as every person has a biological sex. However, some courts prohibit
transgender claims under sex stereotyping because they follow the traditional binary construction of sex established in the pre-Price Waterhouse
cases.15" Under the EEOC's construction of Title VII "sex," transgender

152. Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989)).
153. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *10. This is not the first time the EEOC argued for
such a construction of Title VII sex discrimination. Id. at *10, n.16. See generally Brief of
U.S. EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Pacheco v. Freedom
Buick GMC, Inc., No. 7:10-CV-116-RAJ, 2011 WL 5410751, at *4-6 (W.D. Tex. Oct 17,
2011) (arguing in favor of the plaintiff's Title VII claim of sex discrimination). This brief
states that discrimination because a person is transgender is discrimination because of sex
under Title VII. Id. at *6. The two major rationales proposed are transsexual discrimination is covered by sex stereotyping as expressed in Price Waterhouse and transsexual discrimination is discriminating because a change in a protected characteristic, sex, is
analogous to a change in religion, which was protected by the Supreme Court in Schroer.
Id. at *4-6. Finally, the EEOC argues that the cases relied on by the defendant, regarding
excluding transgender people from Title VII protection, are pre-Price Waterhouse and not
controlling. Id. at *5-6. However, the trial judge ultimately denied the EEOC's motion as
moot after he denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the parties settled
out of court. Id. at *6; see TransAction, "Sea Change" in transgenderemployment rights,
DAILY Kos (Apr. 24, 2012, 6:46 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/04/24/ 1085954/
-Sea-Change-in-transgender-employment-rights (stating Macy was the EEOC's opportunity to speak out after their request in their amicus curiae brief in Pacheco was denied).
154. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at
*56 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (distinguishing the case from Price Waterhouse by contending that at no time did the employer discriminate against the plaintiff for not meeting sex
norms; i.e. she was never told she was too effeminate or given work associated with females). Therefore, the court distinguished between an employee who exhibits characteristics of the opposite sex and an employee who assumes the role of the opposite sex. See id.
(distinguishing the case from Price Waterhouse by contending that at no time did the employer discriminate against the plaintiff for not meeting sex norms; i.e. she was never told
she was too effeminate or given work associated with females).
[T]he Court agrees with Ulane and its progeny that Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sex, i.e., biological sex. While Title VII's prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex includes sexual stereotypes, the phrase "sex" has not
been interpreted to include sexual identity or gender identity disorders.
Id. at *6. There are grey areas in both biological sex and gender. See generally Ilana
Gelfman, Because of Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality of Discrimination
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individuals do not have to rely solely on the possibly tenuous argument
that they are gender nonconforming (because they transgressed their sex
based gender identity and identified with the opposite gender from their
biological sex), but could directly claim the discrimination is based on
their transgender status. This is not to say that the EEOC decided transgender individuals are a suspect group afforded the highest protection
under the law,"'s but that discrimination based on transgender status is
certainly discrimination based on sex under Title VII.
The EEOC evaluated the decisions of the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuit Courts and the District of Columbia district court, which have
ruled in favor of transgender sex discrimination claims under Title VII.
The following is a discussion of the reasoning of each circuit, directly
from their opinions, with emphasis on the portions highlighted by the
EEOC.
C.

Federal Cases Relied on by the EEOC in Macy v. Holder

In Macy, the EEOC cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in Schwenk v.
Hartford.1 6 Schwenk dealt with a claim brought by a prisoner who was a
biological man who presented and identified as a woman.' 57 In her claim,
Schwenk alleged escalating sexual harassment by a prison guard that
eventually progressed to an attempted rape. 5 s Although Schwenk
brought her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing a violation of her Eighth
Amendment rights, and under the Gender Motivated Violence Act
(GMVA),'
the Ninth Circuit drew parallels between the GMVA and
"Because of... [Perceived] Sex," 34 N.Y.U. Riv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 55, 92-94 (2010)
(discussing implications of intersex individuals on Title VlI sex discrimination). The existence of intersex (hermaphrodite) individuals begs the question whether this binary construction of sex is even appropriate today. Id. at 55. Given that there are people who
naturally have the biological anatomy of both a man and a woman, it significantly undermines adherence to a binary construction of sex. See generally id. at 93-94 (proposing
"Congress adopt a law defining 'sex' in Title VII to mean 'perceived sex, which includes
discrimination against any perceived sex category or against the failure to conform to the
discriminating party's expectations of appearance, body, or behavior for any perceived sex
category . . . [and stating] the creation and maintenance of sex stereotypes that affects any
victim of sex discrimination, regardless of whether that victim falls within or between the
binary").
155. Equal Protection issues are beyond the scope of this Comment except where
courts have analogized Title VII claims.
156. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
157. Id. at 1192.
158. Id. at 1193.
159. Id. at 1192. The GMVA was enacted as subtitle C of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1941 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)), invalidated
by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
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Title VII and used the same analysis.160 The defendant argued neither
men nor transgender individuals have protections under the GMVA.161
However, the court quickly dispelled the notion men were not intended
to have coverage under the GMVA by pointing to the legislative history
of the Act1 6 2 and that "sex" discrimination applies equally to both men

and women under Title VII.163

In evaluating whether transgender individuals are afforded protection,
the Ninth Circuit first tried to "define what is meant by gender."'" They
examined the evolution of the term "sex" in the context of Title VII. The
court pointed out that in the past, sex was defined narrowly and excluded
gender,16 5 but that this "initial judicial approach ... has been overruled
by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse."' 6 6 The court noted because of the parallels between Title VII and the GMVA, each is to be
construed as covering sex discrimination and gender discrimination.167
The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the defendant "knew that
Schwenk considered herself a transsexual," and, according to Schwenk's
testimony, only began harassing her after learning that she considered
herself a woman and "included commentary about her transsexuality,"
there was sufficient evidence the defendant's "actions were motivated, at
least in part, by Schwenk's gender-in this case, by her assumption of a
feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor."' 6 8
The EEOC focused on this conclusion in Macy v. Holder. The victim's
gender identity motivated the defendant in his actions.' 6 9 The adverse

160. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1200-01 ("Congress intended proof of gender motivation under the GMVA to proceed in the same way that proof of discrimination on the basis
of sex or race is shown under Title VI.").
161. Id. at 1199.
162. Id. at 1200 (citing the Senate Report accompanying the bill, Senate hearing testimony, and the public statement of the bill's author, all of which included language that
would include men in the bill's coverage).
163. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)).
164. Id. at 1201 (explaining that defining gender is necessary for determining whether
"gender was a motivating factor" in the attack against Schwenk).
165. Id. at 1201 (citing Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-63 (9th
Cir.1977), Dobre v. Amtrak, 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D.Pa.1993), and Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir.1984), all stating that sex discrimination but not
gender discrimination was covered by Title VII)).
166. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000).
167. Id. at 1202.
168. Id.
169. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012) ("When an employer discriminates against someone because the person is
transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate treatment 'related to the sex of the
victim . . . [t]his is true regardless of whether an employer discriminates against an employee because the individual has expressed his or her gender in a nonstereotypical [sic]
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actions could be linked to the victim's gender, which the Ninth Circuit
defined in terms of her gender transition. Thus, both the Ninth Circuit
and the EEOC view transgender status as inseparable from gender.
Next, the EEOC turned to Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio' from the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals."' Smith, "biologically and by birth [a]
male" who was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID),' 72 was
an employee of the Salem Fire Department and claimed she was discriminated against after starting to present at work in a more feminine way.' 73
Smith also asserted she was discriminated against after she shared with
co-workers that she would be transitioning from a man to a woman. 17 4
She alleged that city officials conspired in creating a work environment
that would force her to resign and illegitimately punished her for seeking
redress with the EEOC and in court."' She brought her claims under
both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Equal Protection

fashion . . . .'). The EEOC compares Schwenk to Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., in
which a bank customer was refused a loan application because he was a biological man
dressed in "traditionally feminine attire." Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213,
214 (1st Cir. 2000). The plaintiff brought suit under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA), which the court interpreted using Title VII case law. Id. at 214-15. The court
found the plaintiff may have a viable claim for sex discrimination if the bank attendant did
not give the loan application because the plaintiff's "attire did not accord with his male
gender." Id. at 215-16. This could provide some evidence that gender played a role in the
discrimination, however the court remanded for further fact finding. Id. at 216. The
EEOC seems to have included this case to provide further comparison with cases that
employ Title VII jurisprudence to the construction of the statute at issue with regard to
transgender discrimination.
170. Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
171. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8 (citing Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566,
568 (6th Cir. 2004)).
172. Id.; AM. PSYcHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIsTIcAl MANUAL
OF MENTAI. DISORDERs 576-82 (4th ed.2000) (identifying Gender Identity Disorder
(GID) as a medically recognized mental disorder where one experiences a sexual identity
in dysfunction with his or her biological sex organs); see also Camille Beredjick, DSM-V To
Rename Gender Identity Disorder 'Gender Dysphoria,' ADVOCATE.COM (July 23,2012,8:00

PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-gender-identity-disorder-gender-dysphoria (indicating "[t]he newest edition of the [DSM manual] will
replace the diagnostic term 'Gender Identity Disorder' with the term 'Gender
Dysphoria,"' as a result of years of advocacy and lobbying from the medical community to
remove GID from the mental disorders list).
173. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
174. Id. at 568-69.
175. Id. While claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are beyond the scope of this
Comment, it is interesting to note that the Sixth Circuit has noted several times that Title
VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection claims for disparate treatment are essentially the
same. Id. at 577.
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Clause and the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. 1 7 6
The district court dismissed Smith's Title VII claims, ruling she failed to
state a claim in accordance with Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping.17 7 In
so holding, the district court believed Smith's sex stereotyping claim was
disingenuous and merely used the term of art ("sex stereotyping") as an
end run around her real claim based on her "transsexuality," which it
held was not protected under Title VII.17 1
In the Sixth Circuit's reversal and response to the district court ruling,
the court reviewed Price Waterhouse and its implication, and concluded
that:
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is
engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not
occur but for the victim's sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination,
because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's
sex.1 79
The Sixth Circuit then made a very valuable point. It acknowledged
some courts have held that discrimination against transgender individuals
should be excluded from sex stereotyping discrimination coverage precisely because they can be identified as transgender or transsexual and
therefore fall into a class of persons unprotected by sex discrimination.so
The Sixth Circuit found this analysis incompatible with Price Waterhouse
because it:
[Dloes not make Title VII protection against sex stereotyping conditional or provide any reason to exclude Title VII coverage for non
sex-stereotypical behavior simply because the person is a transsexual. . . . Sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming
behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of
that behavior; a label, such as "transsexual," is not fatal to a sex dis-

176. Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
180. See id. at 574 ("In other words, these courts superimpose classifications such as
'transsexual' on a plaintiff, and then legitimize discrimination based on the plaintiff's gender nonconformity by formalizing the non-conformity into an ostensibly unprotected
classification.").
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crimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.18 1
The EEOC highlighted this assertion, which addresses a main argument against transgender inclusion in Title VII sex discrimination. A
plaintiff may be identified as transgender or transsexual, but despite this
possibly fatal classification, an individual would nevertheless state a claim
under gender discrimination exactly because he or she is transgender and
therefore does not conform to gender norms. 1 82 For the purposes of Title
VII, the problematic non-protected classification of transgender is
blurred with the definitions and understanding of the term "sex" and discrimination based on that trait. Transgender discrimination fits the paradigm for sex discrimination, so it should be afforded the same Title VII
protection.
The final Federal Circuit Court case cited by the EEOC was Glenn v.
Brumby,"' decided by the Eleventh Circuit.'8 4 An employee of the
Georgia General Assembly's Office of Legislative Counsel was terminated because of her transition from a male to female in accordance with
her GID diagnosis and treatment.'18 The claim was again based on
42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for violations of her rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' 8 6
Although this was not a Title VII claim, the Eleventh Circuit posed the
issue as "whether discriminating against someone on the basis of his or
her gender nonconformity constitutes sex-based discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause," and then delved into an analysis of Price
Waterhouse and the sex stereotyping construct.18 7 The Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning relied on how transgender is defined. "A person is defined as
transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior
transgresses gender stereotypes. '[T]he very acts that define transgender

181. Id. at 574-75.
182. See Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *9 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012) (discussing the definition of transgender in terms of gender nonconformity
and holding "discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it's described as being on the basis of sex or
gender").
183. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
184. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8.
185. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1313-14 (firing Glenn because his "intended gender transition
was inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, that some people would view it as a moral
issue, and that it would make Glenn's coworkers uncomfortable").
186. Id. at 1313.
187. Id. at 1316.
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people as transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of genderappropriate appearance and behavior."'"8 8
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit also subscribed to the idea that transgender individuals, claiming discrimination because of the transgender
status, precisely fit the sex stereotyping claim because they are transgender and break gender norms."' It would seem this was the EEOC's
reason for including a discussion of Glenn in its analysis. In this line of
reasoning it is the definition of transgender as gender nonconforming that
firmly plants such a claim of discrimination within sex discrimination.
"Transgender" is defined in terms of gender nonconformity, and because
gender nonconformity is certainly covered under Title VII sex discrimination, so must transgender-based complaints.
Finally, the EEOC noted many district court cases found transgender
discrimination claims cognizable under Title VII based on sex stereotyping,19 and found Schroer v. Billington'" a notable example.' 9 2 Schoer, a

188. Id. (quoting Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees
and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. RFv. 561, 563 (2007)); see also Taylor Flynn, Transforming the
Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual
Orientation Equality, 101 CoLUM. L. REV. 392, 392 (2001) (asserting that the term transgender "applies to persons whose appearance, behavior, or other personal characteristics
differ from traditional gender norms").
189. See Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316 ("There is thus a congruence between discriminating
against transgender and transsexual individuals and discrimination on the basis of genderbased behavioral norms.").
190. See, e.g., Michaels v. Akal Sec., Inc., Civil Action No. 09-CV-01300-ZLW-CBS,
2010 WL 2573988, at *3-4 (D. Colo. June 24, 2010) (supporting Etsitty v. Utah Transit
Authority to the extent that the plaintiff had no claim under Title VII based on her transgender status, but, unlike Etsitty, assumes without deciding that the Price Waterhouse gender stereotyping claim was available to the plaintiff); Creed v. Family Express Corp., No.
3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL 35237, at *6, 11 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (stating that claims for
direct transgender coverage under Title VII are not allowed, but recognizing claims of sex
stereotyping for transgender individuals where the plaintiff shows the employer acted on
the basis of his or her gender in making its adverse employment decision which the court
did not find in this case); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F.
Supp. 2d 653, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding transgender identity is not a bar to a sex stereotyping claim). The Lopez court could not:
[I]gnore the plain language of Title VII and Price Waterhouse, which do not make any
distinction between a transgendered litigant who fails to conform to traditional gender
stereotypes and an "effeminate" male or "macho" female who, while not necessarily
believing himself or herself to be of the opposite gender, nonetheless is perceived by
others to be in nonconformity with traditional gender stereotypes. There is nothing in
existing case law setting a point at which a man becomes too effeminate, or a woman
becomes too masculine, to warrant protection under Title VII and Price Waterhouse.
Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (S.D. Tex.
2008) (emphasis added); see Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. CIV.A. 05-243, 2006
WL 456173, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006) (authorizing a claim under Title Vll based on
sex stereotyping as expressed in Price Waterhouse for a transgender plaintiff); Tronetti v.
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candidate for employment with the Library of Congress' Congressional
Research Center, alleged discrimination for her transition from male to
female after being tentatively offered a position with the Library.'
Despite her qualifications for the position,19 ' the Library claimed a number
of non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring her, including concerns over
her security clearance, trustworthiness, and potential job distraction due
to her transition.'
Additionally, the Library "argue[d] that a hiring decision based on transsexuality is not unlawful discrimination under Title
VII."'9 6 The District Court of the District of Columbia found the nondiscriminatory explanations merely pretextual and further held that
Schroer stated a viable claim under Title VII either as sex stereotyping or
purely as sex discrimination.' 97
Here, in applying the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping construct to
the facts, the district court found "the Library's hiring decision was infected by sex stereotyping."' 9 ' However, the district court also saw a major difficulty with the claim: "When the plaintiff is transsexual, direct
evidence of discrimination based on sex stereotypes may look a great deal
like discrimination based on transsexuality itself, a characteristic that, in
and of itself, nearly all federal courts have said is unprotected by Title
VII."1199

TLC Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (acknowledging an actionable claim for a transgender plaintiff
pursuant to sex stereotyping, rejecting Ulane, and stating "[t]ranssexuals are not genderless, they are either male or female and are thus protected under Title VII to the extent
that they are discriminated against on the basis of sex); Doe v. United Consumer Fin.
Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001) (approving a
cause of action under Price Waterhouse Title VII sex stereotyping theory for transgender
plaintiffs, while failing to address the continued viability of ostensibly prohibiting a direct
claim of transgender discrimination provided by Ulane and its progeny).
191. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
192. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *9 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012).
193. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295-300.
194. Id. at 295.
195. Id. at 299.
196. Id. at 300.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 305.
199. Id.; see e.g., Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, 1985 WL 9446, at *2, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1985)
(agreeing with the seminal case that Title VII does not afford protection to "transsexuals");
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir.1984) (denying transsexuals protection under Title VII); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.1982)
(excluding transsexuals from protection under Title VII); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir.1977) (refusing to grant transsexuals protection under
Title VII).
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Accordingly, this court would have difficulty affording transgender
plaintiffs protection under Title VII based on their transgender status as
an independent characteristic. However, the D.C. District Court ultimately held that it would not matter "for purposes of Title VII liability
whether the Library withdrew its offer of employment because it perceived Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently
feminine woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual."2 00
This court distinguished discrimination on the basis of transgender status
and discrimination for the "inherently gender-nonconforming" traits of a
transgender individual.2 01 It is the gender-nonconforming nature of being transgender that is the real issue. This echoes the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Smith regarding the problematic classification issue.20 2
However, the district court ultimately stated that Schroer qualified for
coverage based on the plain language of the statute and that the discrimination she encountered was "because of . . . sex".203 More specifically,
Schroer changed a protected characteristic 20 and the court analogized
this kind of situation to a change in religious adherence:
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer testifies that he
harbors no bias toward either Christians or Jews but only "converts."
That would be a clear case of discrimination "because of religion."
No court would take seriously the notion that "converts" are not
covered by the statute. Discrimination "because of religion" easily
encompasses discrimination because of a change of religion. But in
cases where the plaintiff has changed her sex, and faces discrimination because of the decision to stop presenting as a man and to start
appearing as a woman, courts have traditionally carved such persons
out of the statute by concluding that "transsexuality" is unprotected

200. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
201. Id.
202. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding the ability to classify discrimination of transgender individuals as "transgender discrimination" does not strip it of its gender nonconformity character). For example, when a man
acts in ways typically associated with women, that activity is not described "as engaging in
the same activity as a woman who acts in ways typically associated with women, but is
instead described as engaging in the different activity of being a transsexual." Id. at 574.
Because of this description, discrimination against the transsexual is not discrimination
based on sex, but rather discrimination based on the individual's status or mode of selfidentification. Id. at 574-75. This classification of transsexual "then legitimize[s] discrimination based on the plaintiff's gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-conformity
into an ostensibly unprotected classification." Id.
203. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
204. Id.
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by Title VII. In other words, courts have allowed their focus on the
label "transsexual" to blind them to the statutory language itself.205
Here, analysis by analogy takes a fairly concrete concept-discrimination due to a change in religion-and applies it to transgender discrimination jurisprudence. The court found that while transgender individuals
may not currently receive class protection, their gender-nonconforming
character and change in their protected characteristic must fit the discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
In Macy v. Holder, the EEOC found the Schorer religion comparison
compelling and saw no distinction between discriminating against a
change in religious adherence and a change in sex:
Applying Title VII in this manner does not create a new "class" of
people covered under Title VII-for example, the "class" of people
who have converted from Islam to Christianity or from Christianity
to Judaism. Rather, it would simply be the result of applying the
plain language of a statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
religion to practical situations in which such characteristics are unlawfully taken into account. 206
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit Court's analysis of Congress's failure to
enact legislation specifically prohibiting workplace discrimination based
on sexual orientation or gender identity stands out within the Schroer
opinion.20 7 One school of thought interpreting Title VII does not read
the statute to protect transgender individuals and finds that "Congress is
content with the status quo." 2 0 8 Here, the district court found it reasonable that legislative inaction shows congressional intent to interpret Title
VII as extending coverage to transgender people.2 09
It is this conclusion that Title VII, as written and interpreted, does in
fact afford transgender individuals protection against workplace discrimination, which is the cornerstone of the EEOC's decision in Macy v.

205. Id. at 306-07.
206. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012).
207. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the
non-passage of congressional bills to "ban[] employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity" and claiming that "[clongressional inaction lacks
persuasive significance"); see Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015,
110th Cong. (2007) (banning employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity). See also Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th
Cong. (2007) (banning discrimination based on sexual orientation only); Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3686, 110th Cong. (2007) (banning only gender
identity discrimination).
208. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
209. Id.
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Holder and its apparent recommendation to employers and other courts
considering the issue.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS OF

Macy v. Holder

"I think that as a society we are becoming more and more open to
the LGBT community. I feel we are possibly in the most amazing
time for LGBTQ rights in the modern age."
- Paula Buls2 10
A.

Generally

First, the EEOC decision, and the DOJ's acceptance, denotes inclusion
of transgender protection under Title VII is binding on all EEOC offices
and federal agencies. 21 ' This also means all federal agencies, as employers, must recognize transgender inclusion in anti-discrimination laws and
in their policies.21 2 Hopefully, courts across the country endorse a similar
view regarding the viability of transgender discrimination claims under
Title VII, as illustrated by the EEOC. Given the trend of federal courts
recognizing the validity of transgender claims under Title VII, there is a
worthy and valuable outlook for transgender victims of employment
discrimination.
Moreover, given that participating in an EEOC investigation is the first
step in the process to file an employment discrimination claim in any
court,2 13 there is a strong likelihood that more transgender discrimination
claims will make their way into the state and federal courts. It is even
possible that this decision will change the way in which employers react
to allegations of transgender discrimination:

210. E-mail Interview with Paula Buls, Licensed Master Soc. Worker, Katy Koonce &
Associates (Dec. 17, 2012) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race &
Social Justice).
211. Chris Geidner, DOJ Accepts EEOC Ruling That Trans Bias Is Covered By Title
VII, A TF Begins Investigation, MLTRO WEEKLY (May 21, 2012, 11:55 PM), http://www

(explaining the
.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/05/the-department-of-justice-has.html
EEOC holding is not the same as a ruling from the Supreme Court but that the decision is
still substantial because it is binding on all EEOC field offices and federal departments and
agencies); see also TRANSGENDER L. C-ra., supra note I ("The EEOC's decision will impact
every employer, public and private, throughout the nation. The decision is entitled to significant deference by the courts, and will be binding on all federal agencies.").
212. WENKE, supra note 18.

213. See Filing a Charge,supra note 93 (stating filing a Charge of Discrimination with
the EEOC is mandatory before filing a discrimination lawsuit against an employer under
Title VII); Overview, supra note 93 (explaining the process for a claim of discrimination
against a federal employer).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol16/iss2/5

36

Ellis: Why the EEOC Got It Right in Macy v. Holder: The Argument for Tra

2014]

TRANSGENDER INCLUSION IN TITLE VII

411

Employers faced with an EEOC investigation that is taken seriously,
and by an agency that unequivocally views discrimination against
transgender people as illegal, are significantly more likely to mediate, give people their jobs back, stop the harassment that is occurring
on the job, settle the case for a monetary amount, and generally
work to make the situation better. The power of the EEOC to help
change a workplace environment when a charge has been filed
should not be understated.2 14
Those who contact the EEOC regarding an instance of transgender or
gender identity discrimination can now assume that their claims will be
"taken seriously and investigated in the same professional manner that all
others are investigated." 2 15 In fact, according to the Director of the
Transgender Civil Rights Project of the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, following its decision, the EEOC made available LGBT cultural
competency training for its investigation employees. 2 16 This should only
increase the EEOC's field office workers' sensitivity and understanding
of gender identity discrimination complaints.
B.

Deference and the U.S. Supreme Court

As previously discussed, there are two types of deference tests typically
applied to an agency action. If the Supreme Court were to afford the
EEOC Chevron deference in evaluating its decision in Macy v. Holderas it was adjudication unanimously agreed upon by the five bi-partisan
agency commissioners 2 17-then the remaining prong to satisfy would be
determining whether Congress directly spoke to the issue.2 18
To this end, the primary question will be what was intended by the
word "sex" in Title VII. However, at worst, there is legislative ambiguity
in defining "sex" under Title VII, either because of a lack of congressional history or a lack of consensus. 2 19 At best, the EEOC dispelled any
214. LISA Moi-rEiT, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, MOVFMENT ANALYSIS: TiEFuii IMPAcr OF THE EEOC RuUING ON TrIE LGBT MOVEMENT's AGENDA 5 (2012),
available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/eeoc-movement-analy
sis.pdf.
215. Id. at 4.
216. Id. at 4 n.10.
217. See id. at 3 ("The ruling was precedent-setting because it was decided by the full
Commission; all five bi-partisan Commissioners agreed to its issuance.").
218. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . .").
219. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting the
"total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment"); Sommers v. Budget
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982) (pointing out that the sex amendment was

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

37

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 2, Art. 5

412

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 16:375

issues with incorporating gender identity discrimination under sex discrimination, because gender identity is a part of gender, and gender is
decidedly part of sex.22 0 if congressional intent was found to be ambiguous, then the decision need only be a reasonable interpretation of the
statutory requirement. 221 The reasonableness of the EEOC's interpretation of the term "sex" in Title VII is well documented and established in
this Comment. "Despite the fact that Title VII . . . explicitly grant[s]
some rulemaking authority to the EEOC, the Court has applied Chevron
deference in only two antidiscrimination cases .... 222 An evaluation of
the application of Skidmore deference will, therefore, be useful.
If the Supreme Court were to apply Skidmore deference to the
EEOC's decision, a favorable outcome could still be assumed. The evaluative factors pronounced by the Supreme Court in Skidmore were thoroughness of consideration, the reasoning's validity, the "consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 2 2 3
Thoroughness and validity of reasoning have likewise been taken into
account in analyzing the Macy decision. Regarding judicial decisions in
other jurisdictions, the EEOC thoroughly dispelled the major criticisms
of transgender inclusion within sex discrimination by addressing the definitional issues and protected classification issue to which other courts
have adhered. Validity of the reasoning is evident in its straightforward
and logical incorporation of gender identity within gender, and therefore,
within sex.
Consistency with an earlier pronouncement was problematic for the
Supreme Court when interpreting the EEOC definition of "sex" within
the meaning of Title VII in a prior case. 2 24 However, the EEOC took an
extra step in its Macy decision, explicitly overturning any of its earlier

passed "without prior legislative hearings and little debate"); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) ("There is a dearth of legislative history on
Section 2000e-2(a)(1) . . . ."); Franklin, supra note 54, at 1320 (asserting there was significant debate at the time as to what "sex" meant and included, resulting in a "deep uncertainty at the time Title VII was enacted about which employment practices the statute
barred").
220. See Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *6 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012) (holding that discriminating against someone because that person is transgender is discrimination related to the sex of the victim).
221. Id.
222. Hart, supra note 102, at 1945.
223. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
224. See Gen. Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (applying Skidmore
deference and finding because of the contradiction between the EEOC pronouncement at
issue and earlier positions taken by the EEOC, no deference should be given).
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contrary decisions. 2 25 This could help the Supreme Court, and other
courts, overcome any difficulty with the EEOC's earlier decision.
While examining the panoply of factors that the Supreme Court could
use in evaluating whether the EEOC's decision is persuasive is beyond
the scope of this Comment, the general thoroughness and soundness of
the EEOC's decision supports a finding that the ruling is persuasive. It is
challenging to undermine the logic of one of the EEOC's key arguments-that if a change in religion is protected from discrimination, a
change in sex should also be protected.2 2 6 Either way, there is a change
in a protected characteristic under Title VII.
If no established standard of deference is used by the Supreme Court
in evaluating the EEOC's decision, hopefully, the Court would side with
the EEOC's line of reasoning regardless. The EEOC's statutory interpretation of Title VII "sex" as incorporating gender identity discrimination is
based on the Supreme Court's construction of sex as inclusive of gender.2 2 7 Moreover, the definition of transgender identity in terms of gender 2 2 8 could make it difficult for the Court to argue that transgender
individuals should not be covered in sex discrimination protections.
C.

Regarding the Employment Non-DiscriminationAct

If the current understanding of Title VII includes protections for transgender individuals under sex discrimination, the federal legislature may
be more effective in passing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) 229 to protect against sexual orientation discrimination, or amend
225. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 n.16; see, e.g., Kowalczyk v. Brown, Appeal No.
01942053, 1996 WL 124832, at *3 n.1 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 14, 1996) (agreeing with the previous
decision that a plaintiff may not bring a sex discrimination claim based on her transgender
status); Campbell v. Espy, Appeal No. 01931730, 1994 WL 652840, at *1, 4 n.3 (E.E.O.C.
July 21, 1994) (refusing appellant's request for reconsideration of her discrimination complaint and noting the "courts and the Commission have previously held that gender
dysphoria or transsexualism is not protected under Title VII under the aegis of sex discrimination"); Jennifer Casoni v. U.S. Postal Serv., Appeal No. 01840104, 1984 WL 485399, at
*3 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 28, 1984) (holding that a transgender plaintiff's Title VII sex discrimination was not cognizable).
226. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012).
227. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (equating gender with
the term "sex" under Title VII).
228. GLAAD Media Reference Guide - Transgender Glossary of Terms, GLAAD,
http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Nov. 26, 2013) (defining "Transgender" as "[a]n umbrella term ... for people whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from the sex they were assigned at birth. The term may include but is not
limited to: transsexuals, cross-dressers and other gender-variant people").
229. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013) (representing
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Title VII to reflect the same. 23 0 Some version of such an act has been
proposed in Congress over ten times since 1994.231 No version of the act
has ever passed both houses, and either the Senate or the House has
passed only two versions of the act since 1994.232
Congress could potentially decide to drop the transgender inclusion
language that has presented a major hurdle for passage of the ENDA,
and instead focus solely on sexual orientation discrimination.2 33 This
would be piece-meal protection, and certainly controversial, but an important step forward from where we are today. It would provide statutory protections for all LGBT individuals, while not in a consolidated
statute; it would be concrete employment discrimination protection for a
large group of Americans.
VII.

CONCLUSION

"No one should have to choose between their gender and their job.
Every employee has a right to expect the opportunity to work hard,
to provide for themselves and their families, and to do this in a workplace free of harassment and discrimination."
2 34
- Masen Davis

the most recent versions of the proposed legislation to provide gender identity and sexual
orientation employment discrimination).
230. See generally Sung, supra note 63, at 538-39 (advocating for an amendment to
Title VII over passage of the ENDA). Claiming the ENDA has been watered down, and
that if enacted "would perpetuate the idea that the discrimination endured by LGBT people is somehow different from-and less objectionable than-discrimination endured by
people of color and women[,]" Sung argues the Title VII Amendment represents a clean
start and offers a more effective way of remedying transgender discrimination claims because it seeks to "redefine Title VII's prohibition on discrimination because of sex to affirm that gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity are not conceptually distinct." Id.
231. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act: Legislative Timeline, Resources,
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/employment-non-discrimi-

nation-act-legislative-timeline (last visited Nov. 26, 2011) (listing the proposed U.S. House
and Senate bills regarding an ENDA); see also Sung, supra note 63, at 501 n.69 (providing a
summary of the legislative history of EDNA).
232. Sung, supra note 63, at 501 n.72-73 ("[O1nly two versions of ENDA made it out
of the House or Senate committees to which they were assigned-ENDA 1995 was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 49-50, and ENDA 2007 passed the House but subsequently died in the Senate.").
233. See id at 504 ("Apparently, 2007 was the first year that ENDA had a real chance
of passing the House, but only if it were transexclusive.").
234. In The News: Transgender Sensitivity Trainings Mandated For TSA Managers At
LAX In a Settlement Agreement, TRANSGENDER L. CTR., http://transgenderlawcenter.org/
archives/375 (last visited Nov. 26, 2013) (quoting Davis, the Transgender Law Center's
Executive Director).
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Title VII addressed a vast array of workplace discrimination-including race, color, religion, national origin, and sex-based discrimination. 23 5
As the Supreme Court surmised, the sex discrimination prohibition requires that in situations other than the "bona fide occupational qualification," sex cannot be taken into consideration in hiring or firing.2 3 6
Furthermore, the Supreme Court used the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangeably, making it clear that gender is synonymous with sex in
terms of Title VII. 3 ' Recent federal jurisprudence shows the term gender, and therefore sex, should and does include transgender
individuals.2 38
Hence the logic followed by the courts in the 1970s and 1980s regarding
transgender inclusion in Title VII coverage has been obliterated.2 3 9
Transgender employees and job candidates are afforded protection under
the Price Waterhouse construct of sex stereotyping or gender norming, as
no one should be fired or denied employment for failing to meet perceived standards of the male or female gender. 240 Taking the argument
for transgender inclusion in Title VII sex discrimination prohibitions one
step further reveals transgender individuals should have and do have protection under Title VII per se-based on the term sex and the definitions
used to describe transgender.2 4 1

235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
236. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (recognizing the
BFOQ exception to Title VIl and concluding "[t]he only plausible inference to draw from
this provision is that, in all other circumstances, a person's gender may not be considered
in making decisions that affect her").
237. See id. at 239-40 ("Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute. In now-familiar
language, the statute forbids [unlawful employment practices] because of such individual's
. . . sex. We take these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions.").
238. See e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding the narrow definition of sex in the pre-Price Waterhouse decisions, which excluded
transgender individuals from Title VII coverage, was overruled by Price Waterhouse and
was no longer good law).
239. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The initial judicial
approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been overruled by the logic and language of
Price Waterhouse.").
240. See e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing Title VII coverage for transgender people under a sex stereotyping claim); Schwenk,
204 F.3d at 1201-02 (ruling sex or gender motivated harassment violated the GMVA by
applying Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293,
305 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding the transgender plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim under sex
stereotyping).
241. See e.g., Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (providing the plaintiff coverage under
the language of Title VII in and of itself); Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012
WL 1435995, at *11 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012) ("[D]iscrimination against a transgender
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The EEOC believes in the validity of this line of reasoning-that transgender people have protection under sex stereotyping and simply for
identifying as transgender or gender nonconforming.2 42 The EEOC eloquently stated their position in Macy v. Holder, a decision to which all
courts should afford great deference.2 43 The EEOC is entrusted with ensuring that all employers follow the statutory prohibitions under Title
VII. 2 4 4 With Macy, the EEOC has clearly taken a strong stance that the
protections they provide will be extended to transgender individuals. Including transgender-based discrimination within the meaning of Title VII
is a sound and logical extension of our nation's pioneering steps toward
eradicating workplace discrimination.

individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination 'based on ...
sex,' and such discrimination therefore violates Title VII.").
242. See id.
243. See Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (endorsing the Price Waterhouse classification of sex stereotyping and a "by definition" application of Title VII to transgender plaintiffs); see also TRANSGENDER L. CTR., supra note 1 ("The decision is entitled to significant
deference by the courts, and will be binding on all federal agencies.").
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006) (authorizing the EEOC to prevent unlawful employment practices).
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